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1 Agro-dealers and green revolutions
In a bid to return the country to food self-
sufficiency, the Government of Kenya has been
spearheading strategies for a new ‘Green
Revolution’ in the food producing sector, as spelt
out in its Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture
(SRA), a ten-year action plan launched in 2004,
and entrenched in its Vision 2030, the country’s
framework for long-term investment and
development (Republic of Kenya 2007; 2004).1
Key among these strategies is the increased
generation, promotion and use of modern
farming inputs and technologies, particularly
improved seed and fertiliser. Small-scale,
independent stockists or input distributors,
commonly known as ‘agro-dealers’, are seen to
have a crucial role to play in distributing these
inputs in a liberalised economy. As key actors in
the Green Revolution agenda, agro-dealers are
thus at the centre of current policy debates
about the future of Kenya’s seed system.
This article charts the rise of agro-dealers in
recent national policy debates on agricultural
innovation and food security and explores how
they command a central position in new efforts
to spark a smallholder-led revolution, asking:
Can agro-dealers really deliver the Green
Revolution in Kenya? Drawing on key informant
interviews and surveys of agro-dealers in two
districts, Machakos in Eastern Province and
Uasin Gishu in Rift Valley Province, it assesses
the different politics and interests at play and
the implications these raise for future
investments in both formal and informal seed
systems and the promotion of agro-dealers as
catalysts of change in the agricultural sector.
2 Delivering the technologies for the new Green
Revolution
Different input channels have been used to
deliver the various agricultural technologies to
Kenya’s 3 million smallholder farms. The main
ones include public institutions, such as state
corporations and public extension services;
commercial channels, such as private seed
companies and their networks of distributors;
and charitable organisations, including donor
agencies, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and relief agencies. In recent years, the
main actors and channels have changed with the
shift from a public input distribution system to a
more liberalised system. But, as we will see,
while the array of actors involved in input
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provision has grown enormously, the vision of
how inputs should be delivered has narrowed to a
single, dominant model: the private, independent,
agro-dealer.
Through most of the 1970s and 1980s, the public
sector managed the input distribution and
information dissemination system, controlling seed
variety development and production and pricing
and marketing of inputs (Argwings-Kodhek,
Kwamboka and Karin 2004). The main actors in
the cereal inputs arena were the Kenya
Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), which was
mandated to develop new crop varieties and
implement the seed industry laws; the Kenya Seed
Company (KSC), which produced and distributed
the new cereal varieties developed by KARI; the
Kenya Farmers Association (KFA), later renamed
the Kenya Grain Growers Cooperative Union
(KGGCU), which procured and distributed
fertilisers and other inputs, and acted as an agent
for KSC; the Agricultural Finance Corporation
(AFC), which advanced inputs credit to farmers
and the National Cereals and Produce Board
(NCPB), which bought cereal grain from
producers and recovered input credit advanced to
farmers on behalf of AFC.
This system mostly benefited the large-scale cereal
producers and farmers in high rainfall areas, who
were also well served by good infrastructure,
particularly in the Rift Valley and Central Kenya
(Freeman and Omiti 2003; Nyangito 2008). In the
mid-1980s, however, mismanagement and political
interference at KGGCU resulted in inefficiencies
that brought down this system (Nyoro 2002). The
failure of the public distribution system triggered
the push for liberalisation of the cereal input
sector as part of the structural reforms imposed by
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
(IMF). In 1990, the government continued this
reform process by abolishing import quotas and
licences and deregulating prices in the fertiliser
industry (Omamo and Mose 1999). The
liberalisation policies also allowed traders to break
down the traditional 50kg bags into smaller
packets, in the hope that this would spur the use of
fertiliser and increase productivity among
smallholder farmers (Freeman and Omiti 2003).
In 1996, the seed industry became fully
liberalised and an autonomous industry
regulator, the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate
Services (KEPHIS), was established to take over
the regulatory role from KARI.
Economic liberalisation policies were meant to
pave the way for a market-based economy, in
which the private sector would take over functions
such as input distribution from the state. Private
companies and urban and rural traders entered
the input supply market, dismantling the
monopolistic network of public actors in input
distribution in most parts of the country. However,
market development has been slow due to capital
constraints, complex trade and licensing
arrangements and restrictive domestic laws in the
seed industry. This has led to inadequate
competition and high input prices, constraining
the adoption of improved technologies by poor
smallholder farmers, especially in low rainfall
areas. As the next section will reveal, the
government is not about to exit from input
distribution just yet. In fact, there have been calls
for African governments to facilitate access to
inputs by resource-poor smallholder farmers
through input subsidy programmes similar to the
one developed in Malawi (see Chinsinga, this IDS
Bulletin). Thus, rather than withdraw from the
sector, the Government of Kenya has remained
actively involved in input provision, with backing
from the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
(AGRA), an international NGO supported by the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Rockefeller
Foundation, the Food and Agriculture
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and
the World Bank.
Since the mid-2000s, a strong coalition of actors
has emerged in Kenya with a focus on stimulating
a new Green Revolution through the application
of new technologies, particularly certified seeds
and fertilisers, delivered by the public and private
sectors (both multinational and local seed
companies) with backing from the state, donors
and philanthropic organisations. This core actor
network sees agro-dealers as central to these
delivery systems. In Kenya’s Strategy for
Revitalising Agriculture, for instance, one of the
government’s policy measures for improving
farmers’ access to inputs is to: ‘assist stockists
[agro-dealers] to increase the capacity for inputs
supply and the provision of information... to
farmers’ (Republic of Kenya 2004). The
ambitious, if somewhat unrealistic, target was to
have stockists providing input services in at least
80 per cent of all small towns by 2007.
Similar calls to develop agro-dealers have been
made by various individuals and organisations.
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For example, during the Africa Fertiliser Summit
held in Nigeria in June 2006, Lennart Båge, the
then President of the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD), called on
various actors to expand agro-dealer networks
across the continent:
We see the emergence of a new rural private
sector, with agro-dealers starting to provide
farmers with inputs… Farmers’ physical
access to fertilizers is improving, largely due
to the growth of agro-input dealer networks
across rural Africa. But this work has to be
scaled up through collaboration between
governments, fertilizer suppliers, NGOs,
farmers’ organizations and international
development agencies. (IFAD 2006)
In line with the appeal to scale-up agro-dealer
networks, AGRA has established its Agro-dealer
Development Programme (ADDP), which is
being promoted in Kenya and several other
African countries. AGRA asserts that ‘a strong
agro-dealer system is crucial to farmers’ success
because these local retailers serve as the primary
conduits of farm inputs such as seeds and soil
nutrients, and knowledge about their safe and
efficient use’ (AGRA 2009b). By August 2010,
about US$7.2 million had been committed by
AGRA for ADP activities in Kenya (AGRA 2010).
These include development of national agro-
dealer networks and credit guarantees to
improve access to agricultural inputs by agro-
dealers and small-scale farmers.
For its part, the Government of Kenya, through
the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), is
implementing its own input support programme,
the National Accelerated Agricultural Input
Access Program (NAAIAP), at an estimated cost
of Ksh16.7 billion (~US$19.2 million).2 This also
involves a capacity building component for agro-
dealers, as well as the supply of subsidised inputs
(particularly improved maize seed and
fertilisers) through agro-dealers to poor farmers.
The next section will examine the ADDP and
NAAIAP programmes and draw on lessons from
the Machakos and Uasin Gishu field studies to
assess their activities and preliminary outcomes
for both small farmers and agro-dealers alike.
2.1 AGRA’s Agro-dealer Development Programme
Since 2006, AGRA has been championing
agricultural development in Kenya, among other
African countries. The main participation of the
organisation in cereal seed systems is through its
Programme for Africa’s Seeds Systems (PASS).
The mission of PASS is to increase small-scale
farmers’ income and reduce poverty through
increasing the farmers’ yields. It is expected that
more than 1,000 new varieties of at least ten
staple crops that increase the productivity of
Africa’s small-scale farmers and contribute to
the alleviation of the hunger and extreme
poverty of 30–40 million people will be
introduced in ten years, and participating small-
scale farmers will be planting improved seeds on
20–30 per cent of their cultivated lands (AGRA
2010; 2009a,b; Rockefeller Foundation 2009).
PASS is implemented under four sub-
programmes. Among these is the Agro-dealer
Development Programme, which provides
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Table 1 Key AGRA-funded agro-dealer development projects in Kenya
Organisation Project purpose Amount (US$) and duration
Citizens Network for Foreign To develop national agro-dealer networks to US$4,473,851
Affairs Inc. improve access to agricultural inputs by 1 June 2007 to 31 May 2010
small-scale farmers.
Citizens Network for Foreign To develop the business and technical capacity US$194,505
Affairs Inc. of agro-dealers and regional wholesalers. 1 March 2007 to 30 June 2007
Equity Bank Ltd. For a guarantee fund to facilitate access to US$2,500,000
credit facilities by poor smallholder farmers, 1 May 2008 to 30 April 2012
agro-dealers and other players in the 
smallholder farming value chain in Kenya.*
Source Compiled from AGRA’s website: www.agra-alliance.org/Map/Kenya.pdf (accessed 30 April 2011).
*This project is implemented in partnership with IFAD, www.agra-alliance.org/content/news/detail/822
training, capital and credit to establish certified
agro-dealers, who are a seen as a primary
conduit of seeds, fertilisers and knowledge to
smallholder farmers to increase their
productivity and incomes (Table 1). Funded to
the tune of about US$7.2 million, the
programme aims to build and develop networks
of certified agro-dealers, to enhance the quality,
volume and range of seeds sold. The ADDP is
hoped to result in well-functioning agro-dealers
in order to support a significant increase in the
adoption of improved crop varieties.
ADDP activities build upon earlier work started by
the Rockefeller Foundation in 2001 under its
programme entitled ‘Developing Rural
Agricultural Input Supply Systems for Farmers in
Africa’. The programme was informed by a
narrative that traced low productivity of
smallholder farmers in Africa to a lack of access to
affordable agricultural inputs occasioned by poorly
developed and weakly performing private sector
input markets that assumed functions previously
performed by the public sector, following structural
adjustment and economic liberalisation. It stressed
the need for a public–private partnership to raise
awareness about improved technologies and inputs
and create a high demand for the inputs; lower the
transaction costs of supplying rural areas with
agricultural inputs; improve the linkages between
importers, wholesalers and retailers; and improve
the economies of scale in marketing of inputs at
the wholesale and retail levels.
The programme’s activities were: training of
rural stockists on knowledge of fertilisers and
seeds, book-keeping, costing and pricing,
managing business relations, sales and
marketing, stock management and managing
working capital. Once completed, these stockists
became certified as ‘agro-dealers’. This was
aimed at enabling the stockists to provide
farmers with credible information on agricultural
inputs use. The certified agro-dealers would then
be linked to major agricultural input supply firms
for: credit arrangements; packing and selling
seeds and fertilisers in small packages and form
themselves into ‘purchasing groups’ and ‘agro-
dealer associations’, which allow them to better
negotiate for lower prices and better credit
financing arrangements with the agricultural
input supply companies, and influence
government policies on imports, pricing,
distribution and marketing of agricultural inputs.
In Kenya, the ADP is implemented by the
Agricultural Market Development Trust
(AGMARK), a Kenyan organisation affiliated
with Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs Inc.
(CNFA) (a US NGO) in partnership with Equity
Bank Ltd. (a national bank), the MOA and input
supply companies, among others. Pilot activities
were implemented in Western Kenya, where use
of productivity enhancing inputs and market
penetration of input supply companies was low,
despite the area having good rainfall and soils.
The programme encouraged input supply
companies to venture into this region by
absorbing part of the market development costs
through sponsoring small field demonstrations
with the inputs and organising input fairs in the
rural areas where input suppliers would meet
farmers and promote their products. After about
three years, these efforts led to an influx of input
marketing companies into the region and
increased demand for modern inputs by
smallholder farmers.
In June 2007, CNFA/AGMARK out-scaled its
activities and started implementing a three-year
programme known as the Kenya Agro-dealer
Strengthening Program (KASP) funded by
AGRA under the ADP. The main activities under
KASP include: implementing agro-dealer surveys
and mapping; facilitating access to financial
credit for business start-up and stocking;
conducting agro-dealer training; generating
demand for farm inputs through field
demonstrations, field days and agricultural
shows; developing agro-dealer output marketing;
promoting a farm inputs savings and loan
programme among smallholder farmers and
supporting formation of agro-dealer associations.
KASP is implemented in 64 districts in six
provinces (Nairobi and North Eastern Provinces
are excluded).
As at January 2010, CNFA/AGMARK had
supported the establishment of more than 81
new agro-dealers in areas with inadequate agro-
dealership and trained 2,166 agro-dealers, of
which about 1,600 were actively participating in
its activities. The organisation had also
facilitated agro-dealers to form an umbrella
association, the Kenya National Agro-dealer
Association (KENADA), and was assisting the
association to develop a business plan. In
addition, over 20 agro-dealers had been
supported to establish output marketing units,
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an innovative complement to the traditional role
of farm input dealership. Through KASP,
CNFA/AGMARK expects to establish a network
of sustainable agricultural input suppliers
serving over 860,000 smallholder farmers by the
end of the project’s third year.
Although the project is still ongoing, and some
districts have yet to be covered, preliminary
results from the two study districts indicate that
agro-dealers based in high potential areas have
benefited more than those in low rainfall areas,
with 48 per cent of interviewed agro-dealers
having been trained in Uasin Gishu compared
with only 10 per cent in Machakos. Further, the
trainings seem to have disproportionately
benefited the larger (wealthier) agro-dealers,
with value of stock (a proxy for agro-dealer size)
averaging about Ksh600,000 (~US$7,160) for
trained dealers compared to Ksh125,000
(~US$1,490) among those yet to be trained. An
area for further investigation is the constraints
that limit agro-dealer participation in these
trainings, with a view to informing design of
future programmes and improving participation
particularly of the smaller agro-dealers.
2.2 The Ministry of Agriculture’s NAAIAP Programme
In 2006–07, the Government of Kenya
formulated its NAAIAP Programme, which was
expected to be implemented in 45 districts over
three years, at a cost of approximately Ksh37
billion (~US$441 million), which framed Kenya’s
food security ‘crisis’ in terms of low soil fertility
and poor access to key agricultural inputs,
particularly improved seeds and fertilisers:
[R]esource-poor farmers do not have the
know-how and cannot afford the cost of these
inputs. The consequence is that soils are
depleted of nutrients, and farmers obtain low
yields. This is the main cause, not only of
declining agricultural productivity, but also of
increasing food insecurity and abject
poverty… [T]hese farmers are so resource-
poor that without external intervention they
will never be able to use these inputs. They
will remain poor and would not be able to
participate in farming as a commercial
enterprise. This implies that the country will
continue to have a high proportion of its
people living below absolute poverty levels and
facing food insecurity to the extent that they
have to depend on relief food… The only way
this section of the population can come out of
the cycle of poverty and food insecurity is for
them to be assisted with agricultural inputs
for a given period of time with comprehensive
training and capacity-building programmes.
(Republic of Kenya 2009)
The primary objective of the NAAIAP programme
is therefore to improve access to seeds and
fertiliser and increase the affordability of these
key inputs for smallholder farmers to enhance
food security and generate income through the
sale of surplus produce. Ultimately, the
programme is aiming to improve productivity and
output at farm level for 2.37 million smallholder
farmers with one hectare or less of land, by first
mobilising farmers’ resources and promoting
efficiency in their utilisation and investment in
agriculture by facilitating access and utilisation of
farm inputs for increased production and poverty
reduction (Republic of Kenya 2009).
As outlined in its Design and Implementation
Framework (Republic of Kenya 2009), NAAIAP
uses a two-pronged approach to achieve its
objectives: the Kilimo Plus (Agriculture Plus)
Starter Kits (input grants) and the Kilimo
Biashara (Agriculture Business) Package (small
business development packs). The Kilimo Plus
starter kits target the very resource-poor
subsistence farmers in districts with reliable
rainfall who own less than 2.5 acres of land. The
farmers are provided with a grant for basic
inputs (mainly certified seed and fertiliser) to
cover at least one acre of maize (this includes
10kg of certified seed, one bag of a base dressing
fertiliser and one bag of a top-dressing fertiliser).
The grants are administered through a voucher
system, which enables farmers to get inputs from
agro-dealers, trained and accredited for the
purpose.3 After supplying the inputs, agro-
dealers then redeem the vouchers from the
government. Target farmers form themselves
into groups, which facilitate training and ensure
that inputs provided are utilised and part of the
produce realised is channelled through the
groups’ cereal banks for sale to finance inputs for
subsequent seasons.
After one season, these farmers are expected to
increase production from an average of five 90kg
bags per acre to about 15 bags per acre.
Assuming an average family size of seven
persons, seven bags are adequate for annual
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consumption, while the remaining eight bags can
be sold and ploughed back in form of improved
inputs or expanded production.4 This way, the
resource-poor farmers can graduate to next
category and participate in Kilimo Biashara. This
package targets farmers with better resource
endowment and engaged in economically viable
enterprises, but lacking basic farming inputs.
Through this package, farmers are provided with
basic inputs at cost and subsidised credit from
financial institutions and facilitated (in terms of
training and technical assistance) to continue
with their enterprises.5
The implementation of NAAIAP has generated
mixed results. By adopting an international
narrative that links low productivity to degraded
soils and lack of access to modern inputs
(specifically fertilisers) and making it the
national narrative in Kenya is inappropriate,
since it ignores important regional agro-
ecological and sociocultural variations. Actors in
different parts of the country have different
narratives about food production constraints in
their regions. During our fieldwork in Machakos
District, for example, extension officers cited
poor rainfall as the main cause of low food
production and hence food insecurity. They also
identified that low use of farm inputs such as
certified seeds and fertilisers was due to high
prices. Yet they also pointed out that most
farmers are poor, lack of access to agricultural
credit, have an over-reliance on maize at the
expense of other drought tolerant crops, as the
other main food production constraints.6
Similarly, farmers cited low and erratic rainfall
as the main challenge, but also mentioned
frequent droughts; lack of basic farming
implements (particularly for land preparation
and soil and water conservation); few extension
staff, as well as the high cost of improved seeds
and fertiliser, as the main causes of low food
production and food insecurity in the region.7
These arguments complement findings of several
earlier studies that linked low adoption of
improved seeds and fertilisers in low rainfall areas
to risk-averse behaviour due to concerns about the
unreliability of rainfall rather than lack of access
to inputs (e.g. Kibaara et al. 2009; Freeman and
Omiti 2003; Owuor 1999). In such areas, it is
argued, inadequate soil moisture renders yields of
most crops unresponsive to inorganic fertiliser use
and in some cases the fertiliser may even harm
the crop by burning it. This limits widespread use
of certified seeds and fertilisers in those complex,
risk-prone environments.
In contrast, in Uasin Gishu, a high rainfall
district, MOA extension staff and farmers were
in agreement that food security is normally not a
problem in the area. They were also in
agreement that, despite the high food production
in the district, productivity (particularly of
maize) was below potential levels.8 The main
constraints to higher yields identified by
extension workers were high cost of farm inputs;
particularly fertiliser, diesel and labour; poor
farming practices, such as late land preparation,
weeding and pest control; and unpredictable
weather patterns, particularly the onset of rains.
Farmers cited low use of improved inputs
(particularly fertiliser) due to high prices and
poverty among farmers; and late planting as the
main constraints to achieving high maize yields.
Second, the choice of maize as the only cereal
crop to be promoted under the programme
seems to negate farmers’ preferences, especially
in the low rainfall areas. In these areas,
agriculture is highly diversified, not only as a
strategy for mitigating environmental risks, but
also because it offers a wide range of choice of
crops that meet the dietary needs of the
communities. Interviews with senior officials in
the MOA identified diversification away from
maize as ‘the key’ to addressing the problem of
food insecurity, which is common in low rainfall
areas. Farmers in Machakos District, especially
those with very small farms, complained that
they did not plant ‘pigeon pea’, a popular
legume, because they had devoted all their land
to a monocrop of NAAIAP maize, contrary to
their usual practices. Focusing on maize to the
exclusion of all other potential crops is an
example of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy that may
actually serve to undermine the very national
food security goals the programme was meant to
achieve. There is a need to investigate whether
the programme would be more beneficial to
farmers (especially in low rainfall areas) if they
have the liberty to choose seed from a basket of
key cereal and leguminous crops.
Third, there was a problem of beneficiary
targeting at two levels. At the national level, the
districts chosen for the project were those
identified as having reliable rainfall or irrigation
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facilities. This means that farmers and agro-
dealers in low rainfall areas would be excluded
from the programme. It could also be an indirect
concession by the programme designers that the
role of agro-dealers in spurring a Green
Revolution in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
(ASAL) is insignificant, even though they are
home to the majority of the country’s food
insecure households and cover 80 per cent of the
country’s land area. At the local (district) level,
identification of beneficiaries proved to be
challenging, especially in higher rainfall areas
where poverty levels are generally lower. Due to
the short period of time allocated for
identification of beneficiaries, village elders and
assistant chiefs played a big role in identifying
beneficiaries at community level. This resulted
in nepotism, with some non-resource-poor
farmers benefiting at the expense of deserving
resource-poor farmers.
Fourth, the assumption that surplus maize will
be harvested in Eastern Kenya is highly
questionable because of the unreliability of
rainfall in most areas. Machakos did not even
harvest enough maize grain to meet their food
requirements in the 2008/09 season.
Furthermore, the assumption that poor
smallholder farmers will use proceeds from the
sale of surplus maize grain to buy inputs for the
subsequent season or to expand their farming
business is not guaranteed. This is because many
of the farmers, due to poverty and a lack of
alternative income sources, are likely to use the
money to meet other priority needs such as
school fees and medical expenses.
As for the outcomes, about 21,500 farmers had
already benefited from the inputs grant by
September 2009, and yet the target for 2009/10
season was 170,000 farmers. In addition, 156 agro-
dealers had participated in supplying inputs to
farmers. However, due to weaknesses in
programme design and implementation
challenges, there were winners and losers. Farmers
in high rainfall areas seem to have benefited more
from the project as opposed to their counterparts
in low rainfall areas, largely due to differences in
rainfall patterns between the two regions.
Similarly, agro-dealers in high rainfall areas
benefited more than those in low rainfall areas.
For instance, many more agro-dealers were trained
in high-potential Uasin Gishu than in low-
potential Machakos (48 per cent vs. 10 per cent of
those interviewed). Further, agro-dealer
participation in input supply was more in Uasin
Gishu (40 per cent) than in Machakos (3 per cent).
In both regions, large-scale agro-dealers benefited
more than small-scale agro-dealers (at the time of
the survey, agro-dealers who had participated in
supplying inputs had stock valued about
Ksh870,000, while the stock of non-participating
agro-dealers averaged about Ksh100,000).
In summary, NAAIAP was designed with the
agro-dealer as a service delivery hub, but
participation of agro-dealers so far in the study
districts was both low and skewed. This is the
result of a number of factors. First, those who do
not meet the minimum qualifications such as
registration with relevant authorities are locked
out. This affects a larger proportion of agro-
dealers in Machakos, where there is a smaller
percentage of legal agro-dealers than in Uasin
Gishu’. Second, there is a lack of capacity in
terms of working capital or business
relationships to secure credit arrangements for
purchasing the inputs, and vehicles to transport
inputs to farming communities. Again, the
constraint is more intense in Machakos, where a
larger proportion of agro-dealers operate at a
very small scale. Third, tedious procedures and
delays in redemption of vouchers from the
government by participating agro-dealers (it
took 3–6 months to be repaid after supplying
inputs) jeopardises credit arrangements and
business relations between agro-dealers and
input suppliers/financiers and this discourages
some agro-dealers from participating in
subsequent seasons, particularly in Machakos.9
In view of these outcomes, there is a need for the
state to identify more efficient strategies for
targeting resource-poor farmers, with minimal
leakages to the non-poor. The programme also
must find ways of increasing participation of
agro-dealers, particularly those operating at a
small and medium scale, for instance by allowing
them to form partnerships. Finally, there is an
urgent need to simplify the voucher redemption
process, possibly by devolving it to the districts
and/or contracting the redemption function to a
private financial institution.
3 Limits of the agro-dealer model
As the ASP and NAAIAP cases reveal, agro-
dealers face several challenges in the course of
their trade, and this limits their effectiveness in
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providing inputs and information to producers
and hence delivering the Green Revolution in
Kenya. The first is a seed industry-wide challenge
occasioned by weaknesses in the regulatory
framework. For instance, the Seed and Plant
Varieties Act (Cap 326) has not been reviewed
since the industry was liberalised. It has, in the
draft Seed Policy, been faulted for insufficiently
addressing seed certification and testing; regional
harmonisation of seed laws, regulations and
policies; and review of legal framework. This
affects seed trade in general and consequently,
agro-dealership. Industry players (under the
umbrellas of the Seed Trade Association of Kenya
(STAK), which represents the interests of
registered seed enterprises in the country, and
the Plant Breeders Association of Kenya (PBAK),
which brings together professional breeders and
institutions involved in the production and
commercialisation of plant seed materials) have
been pressurising the government to review the
seed laws. For instance, the informal system was
included in the initial draft law because the
government recognised the large amount of seed
being supplied from the system. But during
subsequent deliberations, many seed companies
were reluctant to let the informal seed system be
included in the revised version of the law. They
feared loss of market share due to the anticipated
competition from a ‘better organised’ informal
sector in the market. The Ministry of Agriculture
took a strong stand and insisted on having the
informal system well taken care of in the law, but
intensive lobbying by the companies contributed
to slowing down the process of enacting the law.
Also, worries by the companies that the proposed
penalties in the revised version were too punitive
– and not conducive for their operations. The
seed traders have an association, STAK, which is
powerful in lobbying and has access to the
government system.
The second challenge is the agro-dealers’ lack of
working capital to adequately stock or expand
their businesses. As a result, many agro-dealers
are unable to meet farmers’ demand at the peak
of planting season. This supports observations by
CNFA/AGMARK and earlier research in Trans
Nzoia by Nambiro et al. (2001) that lack of capital
was the most important barrier to entering hybrid
maize seed retailing. A separate study by Ayieko
and Tschirley (2006) found that, due to lack of
capital, agro-dealers order less stock, which
increases their operational costs and results in
higher input prices for farmers. This limitation
was cited by agro-dealers and extension officers as
the major challenge in implementation of a
NAAIAP in the two districts examined in this
study. Specifically, most small entrepreneurs are
locked out of financial markets, limiting their
potential for input business expansion, especially
in the low rainfall areas.
The third challenge is the highly erratic input
prices, especially in Machakos and other ASAL
areas. Chianu et al. (2008) and Muhammad et al.
(2003) attribute this to high supply prices and
high transaction costs, resulting from long
distances to input suppliers and poor
infrastructure, especially roads. Due to the price
behaviour, agro-dealers at the grassroots find it
hard to convince farmers to purchase significant
volumes of seed from them. Many poor farmers
opt instead to buy small quantities of certified
seed from them and use mainly non-certified
seed purchased or bartered through informal
networks to top up their seed supply.
Consequently, movement of seed stock is slow
and sales are low, limiting business profitability
and growth. This, according to Chinau et al.
(2008) constrains the development of an efficient
agro-dealership.
In response to this high seed pricing challenge,
many unlicensed agro-dealers in Machakos
District sell to a customer maize seed from a
package they have tampered with, contrary to
the law (Condition 5 on the Seed Sellers’
Licence). One agro-dealer owner observed:
‘… some of my customers ask for 1kg of maize
seed at the price they can afford, yet most varieties
are sold in 2kg packs. For such customers, I
carefully break the package in the presence of the
customer and remove 1kg of seed, which I pack in
another container for the customer. The rest of
the seed must remain in the original container
for easy identification and acceptance by the next
customer who demands 1kg of the same variety.’
This may be a wake-up call to seed companies to
start marketing maize seed in packs that are
smaller than 2kg in Machakos.
A fourth challenge is the erratic nature of
agricultural input demand resulting from
unpredictable weather patterns. Many agro-
dealers interviewed for this study observed that
this variability caused them to lose business
opportunities when there is a sudden upsurge of
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demand, and incur losses when inputs stocks
reach their ‘sell-by’ date (particularly seed and
agrochemicals, which form an important
component of agro-dealers’ stock), due to slow
movement occasioned by unexpected decline in
demand. This challenge shows that low adoption
of improved seeds and fertilisers in low rainfall
areas is mainly linked to farmer concerns about
risk and uncertainty associated with rainfall
unreliability, as opposed to problems with input
accessibility. Also, the choice of hybrid maize as
the dominant crop to be promoted through agro-
dealer networks seems to negate farmers’
preferences, especially in the complex, risk-
prone environments. In these areas, agriculture
is highly diversified, not only as a strategy for
mitigating environmental risks, but also because
it offers a wide range of choice of crops that meet
the dietary needs of the communities.
The fifth challenge is inadequate supply of
inputs at the peak of planting season. Some agro-
dealers interviewed argued that when the rains
set in, there is very high demand for seed by
farmers and many traders suddenly start to stock
seed. This causes the larger suppliers to run out
of stock, yet it takes some time before they can
restock to match the high demand. Kenya’s
Business Daily magazine reported that maize
prices had shot to a three-month high in April
2011, as dealers enlarged their reserves amid a
biting shortage of planting seeds that could cut
this season’s harvest. The shortage is also said to
have been caused by sale of seeds meant for the
Kenyan market, to traders from Burundi,
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda (Andae and
Ng’etich 2011).
However, addressing these technical challenges
alone may not be enough to allow agro-dealers to
catalyse Kenya’s long-awaited Green Revolution.
The larger problem has more to do with the
agro-dealer model itself, which is focused on an
elite version of agricultural innovation based on
a narrow set of technologies that privilege a
particular set of political-business interests. The
mainstream Green Revolution narrative for
Kenya sees agro-dealers at the centre of the
action, and portrays them as the ideal small-
scale private sector solution for delivering new
technologies to Kenya’s farmers. However, the
survey of two districts – one high potential and
the other low potential – shows some limitations
of this simple narrative. These include:
z The uneven geographical coverage with
relatively fewer ‘legal’ and well capitalised
agro-dealers in the poorer, lower potential
areas
z The focus of delivery on a limited number of
seeds and varieties (mostly hybrid maize,
adapted to medium and high rainfall areas)
z The dominance of a few large companies in
the supply chain, with knock-on consequences
for price competitiveness and technology
diversity
z The limited technical knowledge by those
serving in agro-dealerships
z The restrictive nature of regulations, which
limits wider competition in the local market
z Underdeveloped infrastructural support,
which increases operating costs and
consequently input prices, especially in the
low rainfall areas.
Thus, the universalising narrative of the pivotal
role of agro-dealers in Kenya’s Green
Revolution, presented by a strong and influential
actor network at the centre of agricultural
policymaking and financing in Kenya must be
qualified. The alliance between philanthropic-,
state- and NGO-funded initiatives and small-
scale business creates a set of interests at the
heart of the new Green Revolution project. This
combines substantial external funding with high-
level political support and local elite interests.
This is a powerful network, whose dominance of
the agricultural policy agenda has grown
significantly in recent years, with the agro-dealer
model now firmly embedded in all key
government strategies. While the narratives
which sees support to the small-scale private
sector – and particularly the iconic agro-dealer –
as a route to poverty reduction and the
blossoming of a new ‘Green Revolution’ has
many adherents. The realities on the ground, as
shown above, suggest that the current approach
is only a partial solution at best and therefore
must be called into question. The concluding
section draws out some of these qualifications
and their policy implications.
4 Conclusion
Despite the tremendous diversity of Kenya’s
agro-ecological zones and its equally complex
farming systems, a convergence of influential
political, economic and institutional interests are
pushing a singular technological solution to drive
agricultural innovation: the agro-dealer.
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Although different actors – the state,
philanthropic organisations, seed companies and
NGOs – employ different marketing and service
delivery approaches in their activities, depending
on geographical region, there is a clear
consensus on the role of the agro-dealer as the
primary carrier of improved seeds to farmers.
Even seed aid for vulnerable farmers in food
insecure areas is moving towards ‘market-based’
approaches such as vouchers, which require the
active participation of agro-dealers to redeem
them for prescribed seeds and fertiliser.
Several key findings emanate from this study.
First, both formal and informal seed systems are
important channels for delivering cereal seeds to
Kenyan farmers. The informal systems (which do
not involve agro-dealers) provide seeds of local
maize and other cereals to farmers in low rainfall
and marginal areas in the Eastern region of the
country, such as Machakos. The formal systems
use agro-dealers in providing mainly improved
maize seed to farmers in high rainfall areas of
western and central regions of the country.
Notwithstanding the importance of the informal
systems to many small farmers, the legal,
regulatory and policy frameworks, which are
informed by international seed policies and
conventions, tend to favour the formal systems.
As a result, agro-dealers may only spur a Green
Revolution for a select group of privileged
producers, mainly maize farmers operating in
higher rainfall areas like Uasin Gishu.
Second, many of Kenya’s agro-dealer owners sell
a wide range of commodities, including
pesticides, veterinary drugs, animal feeds,
building materials and general merchandise, not
just seeds and fertiliser. This diversity of stock
reflects a risk-coping mechanism for business
survival, given the seasonal and erratic demand
for agricultural inputs, and also helps in
spreading out business costs such as those
associated with transport, handling and storage.
Therefore, any initiatives aimed at supporting
agro-dealers should not focus only on seed and
fertilisers, but the totality of the business.
Another important finding is that less than a
half of agro-dealer owners are involved in day-to-
day management of their businesses, and are
therefore unavailable to field technical queries
from customers. Thus, the trainings in agro-
dealer capacity building programmes should not
only focus on the business owners, they should
also target the ‘managers’, especially with
respect to the technical modules.
Finally, significant investments have gone into
building the agro-dealer network in Kenya,
through a number of new public and private
programmes that have put agro-dealers at the
centre of the new Green Revolution ‘project’.
These initiatives are based on narratives that
frame the problem of low agricultural
productivity in terms of farmers’ lack of access to
modern inputs (specifically improved seeds and
fertilisers). The actors implementing these
programmes see an increase in agro-dealer
density as key to increasing accessibility of inputs
and therefore have undertaken building agro-
dealer networks in rural areas. There seems to be
a general consensus among various actors that
because poor farmers are unable to effectively
participate in input markets, there is need to
provide them with subsidised inputs in order to
stimulate demand for the inputs. However, the
actors are in favour of market-friendly
approaches, which promote agro-dealership and
condition farmers for input markets. The
universalising of the agro-dealer narrative in the
programmes overlooks the heterogeneity of the
smallholder farming population the agro-dealers
must serve and the sheer diversity of agro-
ecological and business environments in which
they must operate. This complexity presents an
enormous challenge for effective beneficiary
targeting and leads to disproportionate ‘wins’ for
farmers in higher rainfall, ‘breadbasket’ areas
and for larger, well-connected agro-dealers
fortunate enough to operate in those places.
In this article, we have argued that greater
attention must be paid to meeting the needs of
smallholder farmers in lower potential areas
(who represent the vast majority of Kenya’s
agricultural producers) by developing innovative
alternatives to the archetypal agro-dealer model
promoted by programmes such as AGRA’s ADDP
and the Government of Kenya’s NAAIAP, which
focuses on a single entrepreneur capable of
running a profitable business from the sale of
agricultural inputs to a customer base, which is
willing and able to afford them. Such alternative
models would focus on the sale of
complementary non-agricultural products or
services with agricultural inputs to create a
successful business or the establishment of
group-based agro-dealerships, e.g. for farmers’
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organisations, women’s groups or youth groups –
which might operate part-time or on a not-for-
profit basis as a service to their communities.
Furthermore, mobile agro-dealers might provide
regular or periodic services to more remote areas
than cannot sustain permanent agro-dealerships
(possibly coming on market days when large
numbers of people gather together). In short,
efforts must be made to move away from the
‘one-size-fits-all’ agro-dealer model as it is
currently construed. These and other alternative
models must be found especially for the lower
potential agricultural areas to complement or
even replace the ‘standard model’ if the Green
Revolution is to be delivered to the majority of
Kenya’s farmers.
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Notes
1 The Kenya’s Vision 2030: A Globally Competitive
and Prosperous Kenya document can be found at:
www.safaricomfoundation.org/fileadmin/templ
ate/main/downloads/Kenya_VISION_2030-
final_report-October_2007.pdf (accessed
30 April 2011).
2 Source: Interview with NAAIAP Programme
Coordinator; and NAAIAP Programme Design
and Implementation Framework 2009/2010.
3 For accreditation, stockists must have been in
inputs business for one year; be registered
with registrar of societies; certified by
KEPHIS and PCPB; Kenya Revenue Authority
(KRA) compliant; certified by
CNFA/AGMARK and recommended by their
respective Development Assistance
Committees.
4 Interview with NAAIAP Coordinator, Mr P.
Makheti.
5 Farmers can access this facility through the
Equity Bank at a 10 per cent interest rate,
which is lower than average commercial
lending rates. The credit is in the form of
inputs acquired from CNFA/AGMARK
certified agro-dealers. The agro-dealers later
claim from Equity the money for inputs
supplied to farmers.
6 Interview with extension officers in all the
eight new districts carved out of the larger
Machakos District.
7 Interviews with members of Kiomo Maize
Growers’ Group in Kangundo District, and a
group of NAAIAP beneficiaries in Mwala
District. (Both districts have been carved out
of the larger Machakos).
8 Extension officers estimated the current
yields of maize to range between 15 and 30
90kg bags per acre, depending on the agro-
ecological zone, while the potential is about
30–35 90kg bags per acre.
9 In Machakos, most agro-dealers who
participated in NAAIAP in 2008 declined to
participate in 2009 and the district had to
engage large agro-dealers from outside the
district (such as Nairobi) to supply inputs.
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